Empathy and Emulation: Life Satisfaction and the Urban Geography of Comparison Groups by Christopher P. Barrington-Leigh & John F. Helliwell
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
EMPATHY AND EMULATION:









We are grateful for helpful comments from Nicole Fortin, Thomas Lemieux, Erick Matsen, Peter Zorn,
and other seminar participants, and wish to acknowledge our support from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
and from Statistics Canada through UBC's Interuniversity Research Data Centre. This research forms
part of the CIFAR Program on Social Interactions, Identity and Well-Being. The views expressed
herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Christopher P. Barrington-Leigh and John F. Helliwell. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Empathy and Emulation: Life Satisfaction and the Urban Geography of Comparison Groups
Christopher P. Barrington-Leigh and John F. Helliwell




Departures from self-centred, consumption-oriented decision making are increasingly common in
economic theory and are well motivated by a wide range of behavioural data from experiments, surveys,
and econometric inference. A number of studies have shown large negative externalities in individual
subjective well-being due to neighbours' incomes. These reflect the role of nearby households as comparison
groups acting in individuals' reference-dependent preferences over income or consumption. At the
same time, there are many reasons to expect positive spillovers from having prosperous neighbours.
We combine high-resolution geographic data from three Canada-wide social surveys and the 2001
census to disentangle the spatial pattern of reference groups in urban areas and to identify channels
of positive and negative spillovers on life satisfaction. We find evidence of significant effects of others'
income at different scales and are able to reject a number of alternative explanations for the findings.
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In many contexts of predictive analysis and policy framing, economists assume
without evidence that desirable beneﬁts accrue to humans based primarily on
their absolute levels of consumption. More broadly, it is conventional to focus
without empirical justiﬁcation on models in which (1) individual returns to be-
haviour greatly outweigh externalities and in which (2) changes in any reference
levels intrinsic to utility vary less quickly than other factors relevant to behaviour.
The ﬁrst assumption may be counter-factual to the external marginal effect of, for
instance, the intrinsic and shared pleasure of human social interaction, or of the
reference-framing comparisons which can motivate consumption and determine
satisfaction.1 In the modern tradition, the focus of psychological and anthro-
pological research differs starkly with that of economics in that regarding both
motivation and well-being, economists focus on ﬁxed preferences over absolute
1There is often confusion over the claims and implications of happiness research, resulting
mainly from a common confusion in teaching and practice of economics at the earliest stage. To
make this explicit, it is necessary to remember that economists mean two entirely separate things
by utility. One use of utility is in describing behaviour. This is a �positive� undertaking; that is, it is
characterised by a falsiﬁable proposition. The proposition is that on average, at least in somewhat
static situations, human behaviour is characterised by the optimisation of some well-behaved and
stable function, the decision-making utility. A second meaning of utility is the original sense of the
word, by which Jeremy Bentham meant well-being. There is no falsiﬁable proposition associated
with the normative choice of using revealed preferences as an objective of policy. This is simply
a value choice. One does not need to believe that humans maximise some preference function in
order to hold as a value that policy ought to maximise people’s choice sets. One does not need
to hold the maximisation of economic choice as a core value in order to believe that behaviour
is roughly characterised by rational (decision-making) utility maximisation. The two claims are
orthogonal. One is subject to scientiﬁc testing and one is not. The two are, however, commonly
confounded by the use of the word utility to imply both welfare and revealed preferences.
Advocates of taking self-assessed life satisfaction as a powerful measure of well-being need not
question both of these claims. Their position is a normative one, a simple value judgment that
the well-being we care about may be, or ultimately can only be, assessed by those experiencing
it. An advocate of life satisfaction as an important objective in policy may believe one way or
another about behaviour being well explained by an optimisation process. Another proposition
entirely separate from the value judgment would be that satisfaction with life is also a proxy for
decision-making utility — that is, that people act to maximise their happiness. Just like the simpler
neoclassical assumption of the existence of a utility function which rationalises behaviour, this is
a falsiﬁable claim, unlike the value judgment that life satisfaction is an important policy objective.
The present work does not address the issue of rational decision making or behavioural max-
imisation of happiness. It does take for granted the untestable value statement that life satisfaction
is a proxy for well-being. This serves as a motivation for the endeavour to determine empirically
the inﬂuences on that well-being.
1consumption while others view social comparisons and behaviour emulation as
central phenomena in human societies.
Economists tend to be sympathetic to concerns about these missing aspects of
human nature but often counter that “allowing” a broad range of inﬂuences onutil-
ity in models undermines the ability of economic arguments to explain anything
non-tautologously. In fact, discussion of interdependent and non-constant prefer-
ences — in the context of status-seeking, habituation, conspicuous consumption
and afﬂuence, and relative versus absolute poverty — has steadily pervaded the
literature on consumption behaviour and the labour-leisure choice since the early
modern economists (Marx and Engels, 1848; Veblen, 1899; Pigou, 1920; Due-
senberry, 1949; Galbraith, 1958; Duncan, 1975). Modern evolutionary economic
arguments (Rayo and Becker, 2004; Eaton and Eswaran, 2003) and corroborating
neurological measurements (Tobler et al., 2005; Fliessbach et al., 2007), psycho-
logical studies, and economic inference provide overwhelming support for the
claim that relative assessments ﬁgure prominently in our utility over consump-
tion,2 yet the detailed nature of these comparisons remains hard to measure and
hard to incorporate into theory.
We pursue instead a more empirical approach. In recent decades the measure-
ment of self-reported satisfaction with life (SWL) has increasingly been espoused
as a new tool to assess the form of the utility function in a direct and quantitative
way. The steadfast exclusive reliance on observed behaviour to reveal (or to com-
pare) marginal utilities is giving way among economists to an increased interest
in and acceptance of SWL as a window into well-being. This may allow the as-
sumptions mentioned above to be assessed head on and invites the possibility of
disentangling questions about behaviour from those about normative goals.
Nevertheless, while SWL scores can in statistical applications generally be
2Rayo and Becker (2004) argue, using a principal-agent framework, that our internal reward
circuitry has ﬁnite bounds and therefore must have evolved with features that engineers would
call automatic gain control and a (temporal) high-pass ﬁlter. That is, the offset and the scale
for processing a consumption level into a psychological reward adapt to make best use of the
available range of the reward experience. Tobler et al. (2005) mention a similar argument in
explaining their observed neuronal activity. Dopamine neurons respond (i.e., reward their host) in
relation to the difference between the received versus anticipated payoffs rather than to absolute
levels. In a controlled experiment using functional MRI to measure brain activity response to
relative rewards, Fliessbach et al. (2007) ﬁnd that midbrain regions known to be inﬂuenced both
by primary rewards like food delivery and by more abstract incentives responded according to
relative payment rewards, independently of the absolute level of payment. Eaton and Eswaran
(2003) suggest a speciﬁc sense in which innate preferences should evolve to be jealous of one’s
competitors.
2treated as a cardinal measure of well-being3 (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Ferrer-i Car-
bonell and Frijters, 2004; Krueger and Schkade, 2008) , the task of unravelling
SWL’s individual and average determinants remains a complex one. Indications
point towards profound ramiﬁcations for policy, and some may already be obvious
but the details lie ahead.
To date, a number of panel studies, particularly using European data, have
addressed the question of relativities in life satisfaction due to income or con-
sumption. Several of these studies show complete adaptation of reference levels
for income over only a few years (van de Stadt et al., 1985; Clark, 1999). More
generally, in a review of the literature, Clark et al. (2008) conclude that, due to the
combined effects of comparison with contemporaries and adaptation over time,
only about 13% of the short term marginal beneﬁt of individual income changes
would accrue after several years if the changes applied to everyone.
Such studies which resolve individual-level changes in fortune support predic-
tions made earlier in explaining a lack of improvement of nationally averaged life
satisfaction in nations experiencing rapidly increasing afﬂuence (Easterlin, 1974).
In this paper, we address the question, “to whom do people compare their for-
tunes?” We focus on geographic aspects of consumption and income reference
levels and on the counteracting social beneﬁts of having prospering neighbours.
Only a few studies have included geographically localised reference groups in the
context of competitive consumption effects on SWL.4 Using geography for delin-
eating reference groups is partly a matter of convenience or, rather, a crude ap-
proximation to more probable and speciﬁcally matched comparison groups based
on social distance. Nevertheless, the evidence corroborates the suspicion that indi-
viduals often exhibit implicit comparisons to geographically localised averages in
determining their overall satisfaction. Our work is closely related to that of King-
don and Knight (2007), who analyse both positive and negative externalities of
average incomes on household satisfaction in South Africa. They use averages at
two scales — village clusters and broader districts — and conclude from amongst
several possible explanations that their ﬁndings are evidence of intrinsic empathy
for those nearby and comparison with those slightly further away.
3Or what economists call utility in the original sense of Jeremy Bentham. Where utility implies
instead a value whose maximisation motivates behaviour, the question is, as already mentioned,
distinct and partly still open.
4We mention here only studies in which reference groups are more localised than an entire
country. Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005) also separates reference groups according to East and West
Germany even after uniﬁcation. See Clark et al. (2008) for a review of the SWL effects of income
more generally.
3Helliwell and Putnam (2007) innovate by using geographic groups deﬁned by
census regions to assess the relativities and additivities in social capital due to
education. They conclude that, at least for explaining a variety of measures of
social engagement, such spatially deﬁned reference groups are more appropriate
than those constructed on the basis of similarity in personal characteristics without
regard for geographic proximity. Their analysis does not relate as directly to the
subjective evaluation of overall well-being, such as we pursue here, yet inasmuch
as people compare themselves with those they know or see, one may expect a
similarly important inﬂuence of neighbours in our study.
Infurtherconﬁrmationoftheimportanceofproximity, KnightandSong(2006)
report preliminary results from a survey in rural China in which respondents were
asked explicitly about their comparison groups. The vast majority reported that
their main comparison group consisted of either neighbours or fellow villagers
rather than kin or people in the township or from broader geographic regions.
In Canada, a ﬁrst look at our current question using Canadian surveys was
conducted by Helliwell and Huang (2005), who included average incomes at the
leveloftheCensusTractinaregressionforSWL.Theyfoundthattheexternalities
of reference levels at this scale mostly or entirely negated the individual beneﬁts
to marginal variation in income.
With considerably more detailed analysis on this question, Luttmer (2005)
uses individual data from the U.S. National Survey of Families and Households
to estimate the SWL effect of local average incomes on individuals. He also ﬁnds
no net social beneﬁt to increasing incomes using reference localities consisting
of about 150,000 inhabitants. In contrast we will at our ﬁnest scale make use of
regions in Canada with a median of 530 inhabitants.
In a rare natural experiment over neighbourhood selection, Oreopoulos (2002)
found no neighbourhood effects on labour market outcomes in a small sample of
householdsrandomlyassignedtohousingprojectsindifferentCanadianlocations.
The principle of invidious income seeking has also been used in revealed pref-
erence models. In a working paper, Vigdor (2006) uses the shape of local income
distributions across the United States to explain voters’ differing tendencies to
support redistributive policy. When local geographic reference groups appear in
preferences over relative income, the seemingly counterintuitive support for re-
gressive taxation by the poor can be explained as a rational response intended to
optimise local relative position.
Given the pervasiveness and remarkable magnitude of the interdependence of
welfare functions on geographic neighbours, understanding the scale and nature
of local reference groups and mutually beneﬁcial social groups is a desirable goal
4with possibly important implications for urban planning and all levels of ﬁscal
and even trade policy. Our objective in this paper is to look for geographically
localised inﬂuences on SWL at a variety of spatial scales in order to determine
which are most important in a developed country like Canada. Popular accounts
of “keeping up with the Joneses” next door suggest that at least in some neigh-
bourhoods, emulation of conspicuous consumption by others is made at a very
local scale. On the other hand, some research suggests that even national status
is relevant, in a kind of competitive economic nationalism. Our contribution is
distinguished from others by its focus on multiscale geography, its emphasis on
urban inhabitants, and its use of Canadian data. Although we are able to resolve
income gradients on the scale of ∼100 m, our main ﬁnding is that in Canada
income comparisons exist and signiﬁcantly dominate any counteracting effects
primarily at the scale of census tracts and metropolitan regions, the latter being
typically several tens of kilometers in scale.
Below we discuss the data and approach (Section 2), present the results of re-
duced form linear regressions in light of possible confounding effects and compet-
ing interpretations (Section 3) and discuss the implications of our ﬁndings (Sec-
tion 4).
2 Data and method
We use life satisfaction reports, among other variables, from three surveys con-
ducted across Canada: the second wave of the Equality, Security, and Community
survey (ESC2, 2002-2003), the Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS, 2002), and the
General Social Survey Cycle 17 (GSS, 2003). See Online Supplement B for more
detail on, and differences between, these surveys.
The surveys comprise a total of ∼70,000 individuals and they have some key
questions in common. Most importantly, respondents were asked to rate their
overalllifesatisfactionona5or10pointscale. Numerousotherquestionsrelevant
to social interactions and socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds were posed,
and some of these variables will be employed below. A signiﬁcant feature of the
surveys which facilitates our geographic analysis is that all three provide six-digit
postal codes of respondents’ residences at the time of the survey. In dense urban
regions these correspond to a resolution of about one street block, or ∼200 m.
Complementing these individual samples is the public use version of the 2001
Canadian Census, which is released with many variables available at the Dissemi-
nation Area (DA) level. In cities, DAs are composed of one or more neighbouring
5Figure 1: Life satisfaction and mean income (k�/yr) averaged by CMA.
blocks, with a population of 400 to 700 people, and they cover all of Canada. Re-
call that in Luttmer (2005) the resolution available is ∼150,000 inhabitants, and
in the popular German panel, GSOEP, individual locations are poorly resolved.
The availability of both survey and census information with extremely ﬁne reso-
lution makes the Canadian data attractive for our purpose, even though the surveys
are cross-sectional and preclude modelling with individual ﬁxed effects. Figure 1
and Figure 2 demonstrate some superﬁcial relationships between geographically
averaged survey and census data, and foreshadow certain results to come.
We also make use of the 2001 Census data at the individual level, but only to
aggregate census-tract income means according to certain population subgroups
detailed later in Section 3.8.
An equation representative of the majority of estimates to follow is the “or-


















6Figure 2: Life satisfaction and self-reported trust in neighbours, averaged by
CMA.
Here the Xi are personal characteristics affecting individual i’s well-being such as
employment, marital status, health, and personality. In the empirical analysis to
follow, a distinction will be made between relatively objective characteristics and
those that rely strongly on a subjective self-assessment. Yi are variables such as
income which may inﬂuence SWL both absolutely and relatively. The region Rir
is the census region of scale r around individual i. Coefﬁcients on relative levels
Yi − ¯ YRir are allowed to vary independently for each comparison region scale r.
ZRir represents other variables describing the geographic scale r around individual
i which either do not have individual counterparts or are not thought to enter the
utility function in a relative way.
We use an ordered logit5 model(1) in order to estimate the underlying, or
experienced, well-being through the discrete measure available from surveys. By
using this formulation we need not rely on a cardinal interpretation of SWL.
5This is also known as a “proportional (log) odds model” for obvious reasons. An alternative
ordinal model, the ordered probit, is often used in the subjective well-being literature. However,
similar results are typically found from OLS and either ordinal method (Ferrer-i Carbonell and
Frijters, 2004). Ordered logit has the advantage of a simple interpretation of coefﬁcients, since
the marginal effect of a covariate on the log odds is constant, regardless of the values of other
covariates. We test other methods below.










δr· ¯ YRir +γr·ZRir +νRir
�
(2)
when ˜ β ≡ β −∑r∆r = β +∑rδr. For instance, consider the case when Yi repre-
sents own income and ¯ YRir average local incomes. Then β represents the marginal
effect on the log odds of an increase to own income, while the marginal effect of
a simultaneous, uniform increase to everyone’s income is ˜ β, the sum of all the
coefﬁcients on incomes in equation (1). It may be noted that since we use loga-
rithms6 of dollar income values, the functional form of equation (1) constrains the
comparisons to enter the well-being function in the form of ratios.
For the estimates in this paper, the geographic reference areas are simply the
ﬁxed regions deﬁned by the census.7 These are each one of: 49,000 Dissemi-
nation Areas (DAs) with median population ∼540; 4800 Census Tracts8 (CTs)
with median population ∼4300; 5600 Census Subdivisions (CSDs) which in ur-
ban areas usually correspond to city boundaries; 27 Census Metropolitan Areas
(CMAs); and 10 Provinces (PRs) containing at least one CMA.
The use of an invariant set of census regions makes possible another tool for
isolating the contextual effects under study. This is to include geographic ﬁxed
6Helliwell and Huang (2005) ﬁnd that linear income can be excluded when both linear and
logarithm forms are included in a regression of life satisfaction.
7 We used two techniques to provide contextual variable averages around each individual for
a subset of census and survey variables and for a range of spatial scales. In one computationally
intensive method, circles are drawn around each respondent’s location at radii of 100 m, 800 m,
2 km, 4 km, 10 km, 20 km, and 100 km. Survey variable aggregates are formed by averaging over
respondents lying in the inner circle or in one of the annuli deﬁned between successive circles. The
respondent is excluded from the inner circle. Census variable aggregates are formed by overlaying
the circles on a map of polygons deﬁning one size of census region (for instance, the DAs). For
the inner circle and for each annulus, a weight is assigned to each census polygon according to
its fraction lying within the aggregation region, and these weights are multiplied by population
counts in each census region to generate appropriately weighted means of the desired variables.
We do not ﬁnd a qualitative difference in results between this method and the simpler one with
ﬁxed regions and thus prefer the simpler one. In order to eliminate spurious correlation of error
terms, each reference region calculated for an individual in this simpler method also excludes the
next smallest census region containing the individual.
8Census Tracts and Metropolitan Areas are special in that they exist only in urban regions and
that some variables, such as those to do with the detailed distribution of income, are only offered
by Statistics Canada for CTs. For urban regions we are able to aggregate these variables up from
the CTs to the larger regions.
8effects at a given level of geography in order to identify spatial relationships at the










δr· ¯ YCRir +γr·ZCRir +νCRir
�
+φCRiR(3)
where CRir is the census region of scale r which contains respondent i’s resi-
dence, r now indexes the census region scale in order of increasing size (DA, CT,
CSD, CMA, and PR), φCRiR is a geographic ﬁxed effect for some scale R, and
where the equation only resolves local relative income effects at spatial scales r
smaller than R. A source of endogeneity of particular interest in this study arises
when unmeasured and geographically autocorrelated factors are related to both
income and life satisfaction. In equation equation (3), the coefﬁcient δR−1 on the
contextual effects of the largest resolved scale is unbiased by any unmeasured ge-
ographic variation present at the scale of R. For instance, consider the unmeasured
inﬂuence of regional price levels, differences in government quality, cultural fac-
tors affecting community strength or lifestyle choices, and variation in climatic or
other geographic amenities. Each of these possible missing variables represents
a source of endogeneity because geographic variation captured only in the error
term νCRir may be causally correlated with a component of SWL captured only
in εi. As a result, all coefﬁcients on smaller-scale contextual effects would be bi-
ased. If these unmeasured inﬂuences exist, for instance, at the CMA level, then
including dummy variables �φ} for each CMA will eliminate bias on the remain-
ing coefﬁcients. By separately running a series of estimates using ﬁxed effects at
different values of geographic scale R, the set of coefﬁcients �δR−1} for R cor-
responding to CT, CSD, and CMA9 can be extracted and interpreted as the local
Veblen effect at each scale.
We make use of a number of objective and some subjective controls in X and
Z. See Helliwell (2003) for a study of similar individual variables and national
measures of social capital which prove to be signiﬁcantly correlated with SWL
in 46 countries. Our controls also include a measure of psychological coping
resources from a series of questions in the GSS. As discussed by Helliwell and
Huang (2005), this measure of “mastery” is likely to over-correct for personality
9Limits of the sample size and available computing power both made the use of ﬁxed effects
at the DA level impractical. Because many provinces are dominated by one or a few CMAs,
province-level ﬁxed effects were generally not used either.
9since it is likely correlated with outcomes (in particular, incomes) but it is useful
in the absence of panel data and individual ﬁxed effects.
3 Results and interpretation
In this section we present our main ﬁndings and test them against several rea-
sonable “classical” explanations for the observed correlations between own and
others’ income. We ﬁnd evidence of a strong relative income effect at certain geo-
graphic scales. This effect appears to be stronger for those who are likely to know
their region better, which is consistent with an explanation based on contempo-
rary reference setting. We further show that not all determinants of well-being
contribute in a predominantly relative way.
3.1 Classical regression
Table 1 on page 11 presents results from a fairly conventional series of regressions
for life satisfaction among urban survey respondents. Each non-shaded column
reports coefﬁcients and standard errors for one regression using data from the
survey indicated in the row labeled “survey”. In all cases shown, coefﬁcients are
from an ordered logit model and are displayed in raw, unexponentiated form.10
For example, column (3) in Table 1 indicates that a factor 10 increase in household
income, holding other variables constant, is associated with a 34% increase (since
e0�29 ≈1�34) in the predicted odds of being at least one step higher on the standard
ten-point SWL scale.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 1 record estimates of similar models car-
ried out separately on data from urban respondents in each of three surveys.
Missing coefﬁcients reﬂect the lack of certain questions in some surveys. The
fourth, shaded column contains mean coefﬁcients for each covariate, calculated
by weighting each individual estimate by the inverse square of its standard error.
When a variable is only available from a subset of the surveys, the mean shown
reﬂects the coefﬁcients from available regressions. The geographic ﬁxed effects
10This provides easy identiﬁcation of positive and negative effects based on the sign of the
coefﬁcient. In accordance with equation (1), an exponentiated coefﬁcient represents the modeled
change, for a one unit increase in the covariate, of the ratio of probabilities of reported SWL being
in a higher category to that of it being in any lower one. In the ordered logit model, this marginal
inﬂuence on probability is the same for any values of the other covariates — and thus at any level
of life satisfaction.
10(1) (2) (3) �1-3� (4) (5) (6) �4-6� (7) (8) (9) �7-9� (11) (12) �11-12�
log(HH inc) .48∗ .21∗ .29∗ .26∗ .52∗ .23∗ .31∗ .29∗ .57∗ .25∗ .32∗ .29∗ .30∗ .71∗ .37∗
(.12) (.046) (.055) (.034) (.12) (.046) (.044) (.031) (.15) (.049) (.053) (.035) (.097) (.21) (.088)
health 1.64∗ 2.73∗ 2.55∗ 1.61∗ 2.74∗ 2.40∗ 1.56∗ 2.77∗ 2.56∗ 3.25∗ 3.25∗
(.21) (.093) (.085) (.17) (.11) (.094) (.25) (.12) (.10) (.39) (.39)
trust-N .50∗ 1.73∗ 1.03∗ 1.13∗ .51∗ 1.80∗ 1.01∗ 1.01∗ .57∗ 1.84∗ 1.06∗ 1.14∗ 2.25∗ .99∗ 1.77∗
(.11) (.095) (.083) (.054) (.076) (.097) (.12) (.053) (.092) (.092) (.070) (.048) (.18) (.23) (.14)
married .55∗ .44∗ .41∗ .44∗ .58∗ .47∗ .41∗ .45∗ .57∗ .46∗ .40∗ .44∗ .74∗ .29 .67∗
(.11) (.060) (.065) (.041) (.12) (.056) (.049) (.035) (.12) (.057) (.059) (.039) (.12) (.27) (.11)
asmarried .34 .51∗ .39∗ .42∗ .26 .42∗ .32∗ .35∗ .19 .45∗ .29∗ .34∗ .46 .56 .50∗
(.14) (.090) (.073) (.053) (.13) (.066) (.055) (.040) (.16) (.088) (.078) (.055) (.20) (.26) (.16)
separated −.44∗ −.44∗ −.46∗ −.46∗ −.46∗ −.46∗ −1.13∗ −1.13∗
(.10) (.10) (.078) (.078) (.092) (.092) (.35) (.35)
divorced −.24 −.077 −.11 −.16 −.087 −.092∗ −.26 −.096 −.11∗ .085 .085
(.16) (.086) (.076) (.21) (.057) (.055) (.21) (.072) (.068) (.36) (.36)
widowed .25 .001 .062 .32 −.020 .051 .30 −.050 .004 .14 .14
(.22) (.13) (.11) (.24) (.12) (.11) (.33) (.14) (.13) (.48) (.48)
male −.12∗ −.068∗ −.16∗ −.12∗ −.12∗ −.073∗ −.17∗ −.13∗ −.091 −.066∗ −.17∗ −.12∗ −.18 −.18 −.18∗
(.071) (.040) (.039) (.026) (.046) (.038) (.032) (.022) (.078) (.039) (.037) (.025) (.077) (.18) (.071)
noReligion −.011 −.19∗ −.13∗ .093 −.14∗ −.10∗ .12 −.12∗ −.058 .20 −.22 .060
(.063) (.046) (.037) (.079) (.037) (.034) (.077) (.045) (.039) (.13) (.18) (.10)
godImportance .47∗ .54∗ .35∗ .44∗ .57∗ .60∗ .40∗ .51∗ .59∗ .62∗ .41∗ .52∗ .82∗ .61∗ .76∗
(.12) (.067) (.059) (.041) (.075) (.070) (.061) (.039) (.088) (.068) (.057) (.039) (.14) (.20) (.11)
student 1.26∗ .67∗ 1.02∗ 1.26∗ .66∗ .99∗ 1.25∗ .54∗ .93∗ 1.65∗ .57 1.48∗
(.14) (.17) (.11) (.15) (.16) (.11) (.16) (.18) (.12) (.29) (.69) (.27)
employed 1.19∗ .59∗ .95∗ 1.19∗ .59∗ .93∗ 1.19∗ .48∗ .84∗ 1.45∗ .36 1.27∗
(.13) (.16) (.099) (.14) (.15) (.10) (.16) (.16) (.11) (.26) (.60) (.24)
domestic 1.07∗ .71∗ .92∗ 1.07∗ .71∗ .89∗ 1.10∗ .58∗ .82∗ 1.26∗ .19 1.08∗
(.15) (.17) (.11) (.15) (.14) (.10) (.17) (.16) (.12) (.29) (.63) (.26)
unemployed −.85∗ −.13 −.51∗ −.82∗ −.14 −.37∗ −.78∗ −.24 −.45∗ −.32 −.32
(.20) (.20) (.14) (.29) (.21) (.17) (.26) (.21) (.17) (.69) (.69)
retired 1.42∗ .85∗ 1.17∗ 1.40∗ .85∗ 1.12∗ 1.42∗ .72∗ 1.03∗ 1.75∗ .26 1.38∗
(.15) (.17) (.11) (.13) (.13) (.090) (.19) (.17) (.12) (.31) (.53) (.27)
age −.065∗ −.055∗ −.086∗ −.071∗ −.064∗ −.059∗ −.088∗ −.075∗ −.063∗ −.063∗ −.091∗ −.077∗ −.072∗ −.086 −.075∗
(.014) (.009) (.008) (.005) (.014) (.009) (.007) (.005) (.019) (.009) (.008) (.006) (.016) (.034) (.014)
(age/100)2 8.14∗ 5.58∗ 8.47∗ 7.29∗ 7.82∗ 5.94∗ 8.66∗ 7.61∗ 7.83∗ 6.38∗ 8.99∗ 7.79∗ 7.50∗ 7.59 7.52∗
(1.41) (.97) (.92) (.60) (1.26) (.94) (.77) (.54) (1.82) (.98) (.91) (.63) (1.83) (3.78) (1.65)
CMA f.e. � � � �
CSD f.e. � � � �
CT f.e. � � �
survey E2 ED G17 �3� E2 ED G17 �3� E2 ED G17 �3� ED G17 �2�
obs. 2633 24113 12970 39716 2535 24113 12970 39618 2013 23468 12197 37678 8454 1397 9851
pseudo-R2 .037 .053 .062 .039 .058 .064 .044 .069 .069 .167 .100
Nclusters 30 42 46 47 221 192 762 111
Table 1: A “classical” regression for life satisfaction on household income and
personal characteristics. Estimated coefﬁcients are shown from ordered logit
models of SWL. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using clustering
whenever geographic ﬁxed effects (f.e.) are indicated. Surveys are identiﬁed
with E2 for ESC2, ED for EDS, and G17 for GSS17. Shaded columns indicating
by �3� that multiple surveys are included present weighted means of coefﬁcients
from estimations carried out separately for each survey. Not shown are a series
of controls for household size. Only urban respondents are included. Signiﬁ-
cance: 1%∗ 5� 10�∗
11described in equation equation (3) are accounted for by including dummies at one
level of census geography, as indicated by the rows CMA f.e. for metropolitan
area ﬁxed effects, CT f.e. for census tract ﬁxed effects, and so on. Standard errors
are calculated using clustering with the same groups as used for the geographic
ﬁxed effects.
Unlike the majority of results to follow, the explanatory variables in Table 1 do
not include regional averages of income. A standard interpretation of the positive
coefﬁcients for household income (in log10 form) found for this speciﬁcation is
that increasing incomes can be expected to beneﬁt average SWL. The results also
show that most coefﬁcients, including that on household income, are relatively
unaffected by the inclusion of regional ﬁxed effects. Unsurprisingly in light of the
existing literature, measures of self-reported health, trust in neighbours, religios-
ity, involvement in a marriage-like relationship, youth, and old age have positive
and signiﬁcant partial correlations with SWL. Being unemployed and being male
are each negative predictors of reported well-being. Included in all regressions but
not shown are dummy variables for household size. Categories of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and
>5 occupants are admitted in order to account for different impacts of household
income on survey respondents.
Aside from the self-reported health and trust variables, the set of non-income
controls used in this table will frequently be used but not shown explicitly in
subsequent estimates. Although religiosity is included among them, we consider
these variables to be relatively objective attributes as compared with health and
trust. These latter subjective measures may be inﬂuenced by the respondent’s
personality type and current level of affect at the time of the interview.11 They are
nevertheless considered to be important and distinct determinants of SWL and, if
anything, can be expected to correct partly for the individual variation in optimism
and personality type which might play into SWL responses.
The row labeled “pseudo-R2” provides a measure of the explained portion of
individual variation in the dependent variable. It is generally believed that all but
about 10%-20% of SWL variation between adult individuals is due to predeter-
mined individual characteristics (Diener, 1984), which gives rise to a low pseudo-
R2 in all our estimates. The table shows that progressive inclusion of ﬁxed effects
at the province, metro area, city, and census tract level has the result of increas-
ing the explained portion of individual variation without signiﬁcantly changing
other coefﬁcients.12 Similar results to these are obtained (but not shown) using
11See, however, Barrington-Leigh (2008b) for an effort to quantify this inﬂuence.
12The number of observations diminishes considerably when CT dummies are included in the
12an OLS model. In that case, the R2 varies as high as 0.39 in the case with local
ﬁxed effects at the census tract level. This suggests that, despite the large idiosyn-
cratic variability in reported SWL, localised factors are an important determinant
of SWL.
3.2 Veblen effects
Table 2 shows estimates of the same equations as Table 1 but now augmented with
reference income levels. The coefﬁcient β on the logarithm of own household
income now represents the individual marginal beneﬁt of income when others’ in-
comes are held constant. Rows (1) and (2) indicate that a factor of 10 increase in
own household income, holding others’ constant, is associated with only a 20% or
30% increase in the probability of being one point higher out of 10 in SWL. This
small value is consistent with previous studies. It is also similar to that found in
the previous “classical” regression, likely reﬂecting the fact that respondents pre-
dominantly live in large, high-income cities. The row labelled “∑βinc” shows
˜ β, the sum of the various income coefﬁcients (see (2)). This is the net social
beneﬁt of marginal changes to the household income of oneself and of everyone
else in one’s own CMA. This value is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that, hold-
ing other factors constant, respondents in metro areas with higher average income
tend to report a signiﬁcantly lower satisfaction with life. This reduced-form result
appears to be stronger than that found in other studies. It does not, however, imply
that raising the income level of all metro regions at once would result in decreased
well-being, since all national-level effects, including federal public goods funded
by income taxes, are held constant in the present analysis. Clearly to encompass
all these channels of inﬂuence one must appeal to cross-country comparisons.
Reminiscent of the ﬁndings of Kingdon and Knight (2007) is the positive co-
efﬁcient generally found on the most local geographic reference group’s income
along with negative coefﬁcients on the mean income of wider regions.
As described in Section 2, these reference levels are based on mean incomes
reported in the 2001 census and exclude residents of the next smallest census re-
gion containing each respondent. For instance, the CSD average income is calcu-
lated for each survey respondent as the mean household income amongst residents
who live in the respondent’s CSD but not in his or her CT. CSD mean income,
equation, so the corresponding rise in the explained portion is less remarkable in this case. The set
of included respondents is in each case restricted by the exclusion of regions with few samples.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14which is likely to be related through taxes to the amount of funding in the civic
jurisdiction, receives an insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient. In general, progressively incor-
porating ﬁxed effects does not signiﬁcantly alter the estimated coefﬁcients. This
indicates that our measures of mean census income are not proxying for other,
unmeasured geographic characteristics, and that collinearity between income at
different geographic scales is not driving the results.
3.3 Exposure response
In order to seek revealing differences, we next estimate the geographic spillover
effects of income for different subpopulations. Outside of the Online Supplement,
a simpler form of tabulated estimates is given in most of the tables to follow.
Table 3 exempliﬁes this summary format and its ﬁrst two columns summarise all
of Table 2.
Column (1) contains the mean coefﬁcients for the baseline equation already
recorded in column �1−2� of Table 2. Column (2) of Table 3 compiles the mean
coefﬁcients on �δR−1} described in Section 2 and taken from columns �4−6�,
�7−9�, and �10−12� in Table 2. These correspond to the estimated marginal
beneﬁt of a region’s income when ﬁxed effects at the next highest geographic
scale are controlled for.
The remaining odd-numbered columns similarly show coefﬁcients, averaged
over surveys, from regressions without ﬁxed effects but carried out over speciﬁc
subsetsofthesurveysample, asindicatedbytherowscontaining�’sand×’s. The
even-numbered columns display the coefﬁcients �δR−1} from the corresponding
set of regressions carried out with geographic controls. The row labeled “survey”
indicates which survey or how many surveys were used. When fewer than three
surveys are used it is because not all offer the criterion deﬁning the particular
subpopulation. For instance, columns (5) and (6) reﬂect the fact that only GSS17
includes a question about the length of neighbourhood tenure.
Columns (3) to (10) show that survey respondents who indicate tenure in their
neighbourhood or city of at least ten years are more strongly and negatively af-
fected by a higher income in their local region (CT).
Conversely, those who have relocated more recently appear to beneﬁt more
from the afﬂuence of their close neighbours at the DA scale. There is also the
suggestion that those who are “new” to the city may be less sensitive to CMA
mean income than those who are new to their neighbourhood but may not be new
to the city. Columns (11)–(14) indicate that the negative effect of nearby others’
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Homeowners and non-owners, shown in columns (15) to (18), differ in the
dependence of their reported SWL on both their own household income and on
others’. One may hypothesize that homeowners are likely to have lived in the
same neighbourhood for longer, and therefore be more inﬂuenced by its norms.
On the other hand, non-homeowners are likely to feel less secure and settled in re-
gions with high incomes and house prices. These suppositions ﬁnd support in the
differences between coefﬁcients on CT and CMA incomes for homeowners and
renters, but alternative hypotheses will need to be addressed below for a conﬁdent
interpretation.
3.4 Price levels
All income variables presented so far have been measured in nominal terms, un-
corrected for price levels. One natural objection to ﬁnding a strongly negative
coefﬁcient on the metropolitan area’s mean income in nominal terms is that this
average is likely to reﬂect regional price levels. The negative coefﬁcient could
therefore reﬂect individuals’ intrinsic assessment of their real income. Because
inter-regional price level comparisons are difﬁcult to carry out,13 we cannot cor-
rect all income measures for local buying power. However, geographic ﬁxed ef-
fects naturally account for any possible variation in local costs as well as geo-
graphic amenities. Assuming that mobility is high enough for CMA-level ﬁxed
effects to capture the main differences in the value of nominal incomes, it remains
only to test our estimates of CMA-level effects using the available price compara-
tors. Restricting the sample to ten major city regions for which Statistics Canada
calculates comparative cost of living data and repeating our baseline estimate, we
ﬁnd the same pattern of coefﬁcents, as shown in Table 4.
13Statistics Canada remains cautious in accounting for housing cost differences across loca-
tions, and therefore provides only very limited consumer price comparisons across Canada [Per-
sonal communication, Erwin Diewert]. In general, when geographic location confers amenity
values, prices for real estate and even other local commercial goods may incorporate an associ-
ated premium. In principle, such premia may reﬂect physical characteristics of the location or an
endogenous social value of exclusivity. See Barrington-Leigh (2008a) for a model of endogenous
exclusivity in real estate value driven by pure Veblen consumption.
17(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(HH inc) .27∗ .35∗ .24∗ .27
DA: log(HH inc) .28 .27 .28∗ .12
CT: log(HH inc) −.43∗ −.51∗ −.41 −.43∗
CSD: log(HH inc) −.24 −.12 −.16 −.021




CMA prices � �
controls � � � �
geo ﬁxed effects � �
survey �3� �2� �3� �2�
obs. 36931 ≥9620 24094 ≥6793
Table 4: Effect of CMA price correction. Summary of estimates in the format
described on page 16. Estimates in the columns with “CMA prices” are carried
out with all income measures corrected for CMA price level. Only CMAs for with
available price indices are included. Signiﬁcance: 1%∗ 5� 10�∗
183.5 Wealth and income
Ideally, in a neoclassical formulation a better measure of lifetime expected wealth
— or indeed of current consumption — would be included to predict SWL. We
next test some alternative speciﬁcations in order to account for the possibility
of mismeasuring an absolute consumptive contribution to SWL. Luttmer (2005)
addresses the concern that relying on the log of mean household income as a ref-
erence value may just provide ﬂexibility to accomodate an alternative, underlying
functional form for households’ own income. Table 5 shows a test against this
possibility by incorporating, along with the dummy variables for household size
that are always included, the respondent’s own income and his or her household’s
income adjusted in a conventional way for family size.14 Also in this speciﬁca-
tion are the respondent’s housing payments, estimated house market value, and
the nearby average of reported house values from the census. Because a primary
form of savings for many households is in house ownership, living in an afﬂuent
area may proxy for owning at least part of a relatively expensive house. While
a higher house value might imply higher mortgage payments for house owners
and therefore less current consumption of other goods, it may also be a less noisy
indicator of total wealth and thus future expectations of afﬂuence than is current
income.
The table shows in columns (1) to (4) mean coefﬁcents from the available
surveys. The ﬁnal column summarises the geographic reference effect estimates
using ﬁxed effects at each level. The coefﬁcients estimated with CT ﬁxed effects
suffer from a small sample size in one survey, which accounts for the large coef-
ﬁcient on own income; see Table 13 on page 46 in the Online Supplement. As
noted by Helliwell and Huang (2005), the dominance of household income over
personal income, even for wage earners in a multi-person household, is evidence
of empathy dominating over any relative income effects within the household unit.
Available in Canadian census data and the EDS survey is a question about the
size of one’s primary dwelling. One’s own house size is a signiﬁcant candidate
for measures of conspicuous afﬂuence, and thus Veblen effects, but a large and
comfortable home may also represent a direct channel through which material
consumption promotes SWL. In addition, a measure of local house sizes may be
a further proxy for respondents’ wealth or indebtedness. With these motivations,
Table 6 reports a speciﬁcation that includes measures of own and local house size.
14This “household equivalent” income measure is not used throughout most of the analysis
because the inclusion of a set of separate controls for household sizes is a less restrictive speciﬁ-
cation.
19(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(own inc) .049 .038 .11∗ .35 .35
log(HH inc/
√
hh) .18∗ .22∗ .15 .059 .059
DA: log(HH inc) .37 .36 .30∗ .089 .089
CT: log(HH inc) −.56∗ −.60∗ −.67∗ −.67∗
CSD: log(HH inc) −.13 −.14 −.14
CMA: log(HH inc) −.87∗ −.87∗
∑βinc −1.06 .21 −.12 .96
mortgagePayment −.034 −.030−.024 .050
log(houseValue) .13 .15 .095 −.006
DA: log(houseValue) −.15 −.10 .14 .11 .11
health 2.71∗ 2.81∗ 2.84∗ 3.19∗
trust-N 1.27∗ 1.52∗ 1.37∗ 1.82∗
trust-G −.0004 .018 .021 −.14
controls � � � � �
Geo dummies CMA CSD CT �
survey �3� �2� �2� �2� �2�
obs. 27634 2690125486 4142 ≥4142
pseudo-R2
Table 5: Summary of alternate measures of wealth and income. The ﬁrst four
columns represent coefﬁcients averaged over surveys, as in the shaded columns
of Table 2 on page 14. The ﬁfth column shows summary coefﬁcients of the kind
described on page 16. Detailed estimates summarised in this table are found in
Table 13 on page 46. Signiﬁcance: 1%∗ 5� 10�∗
20(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(HH inc) .20∗ .21∗ .21∗ .14 .14
DA: log(HH inc) .28 .21 .29 .35 .35
CT: log(HH inc) −.60 −.79∗ −.59 −.59
CSD: log(HH inc) −.37 −.22 −.22
CMA: log(HH inc) −.59∗ −.59∗
∑βinc −1.05∗ −1.18∗ .088 .49
houseRooms .002 .004 .006 .003
DA: houseRooms .007 .029 .008 .053
CT: houseRooms .006 .019 .001
health 2.61∗ 2.66∗ 2.85∗
trust-N 1.33∗ 1.30∗ 1.63∗ 2.21∗
trust-G −.004 .018 .017 .009
controls � � � � �
Geo dummies CMA CSD CT �
survey �3� �3� �2� �1� �1�
obs. 26990 26884 24486 4424 ≥4424
pseudo-R2
Table 6: Own and neighbours’ dwelling sizes. The ﬁrst four columns repre-
sent coefﬁcients averaged over surveys, as in the shaded columns of Table 2 on
page 14. The ﬁfth column shows summary coefﬁcients of the kind described on
page 16. Detailed estimates summarised in this table are found in Table 14 on
page 47. Signiﬁcance: 1%∗ 5� 10�∗
OtherthanapossibledecreaseinthestrengthoftheCMA-levelVeblencoefﬁcient,
we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant changes in income effects and no signiﬁcant role for own or
neighbours’ dwelling sizes.
3.6 Life in the big city
Canada has a small number of large metropolitan areas, making it a difﬁcult object
of study for unpacking different CMA-level inﬂuences on SWL. It is possible that
mean incomes are correlated with (i.e., proxying for) the size of a metropolis and
that the coefﬁcient on mean CMA income is reﬂecting an omitted variable bias






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22There are a number of such factors missing in the baseline equation which one
might suppose to be correlated with both mean incomes and life satisfaction. At
the risk of over-correcting for these factors, Table 7 summarises estimates from a
speciﬁcation incorporating the fraction of immigrants at CT and CSD scales, the
population size and density �ρ), and local average trust levels. These variables are
motivated by the fact that high density areas tend to hold a more transient popu-
lation which may affect social capital and, in turn, SWL. Qualitatively, the results
with these controls reproduce the patterns found in the baseline case, especially
for the CT-level coefﬁcients.
3.7 Symmetry of income effects
Another way to subdivide the sample is in accordance with income itself. Other
studies have reached different conclusions on the question of whether the rela-
tively poor or the relatively rich are especially inﬂuenced by the comparison of
incomes. One might expect the afﬂuent to be more interested in relative status
(Veblen, 1899). Conversely, one might expect the below-mean group to be more
affected if emulation behaviour is more inﬂuenced by upward than downward
comparisons, in accordance with the idea of “loss aversion”. Luttmer (2005) ﬁnds
no asymmetry in the effect of neighbours’ income between those above and be-
low the median income. Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005) reports mixed results, with
West Germans showing an asymmetric and upwards comparison effect but East
Germans showing symmetric reference behaviour. McBride (2001) reports the
opposite — a signiﬁcantly stronger inﬂuence of the comparison group, and corre-
spondingly weaker inﬂuence of own income, for high-income respondents in the
1994 USA General Social Survey. Similarly, Kingdon and Knight (2007) ﬁnd in
South Africa that relative income is more important at higher levels of absolute
income.
We look for deviations from our linear speciﬁcation by modifying equation (1)
to allow separate coefﬁcients ∆+
r , ∆−
r in each region r for those respondents above
(�+
ir = 1; �−
ir = 0) and below (�+
ir = 0; �−



























DA: ∆−log(HH inc) .18∗
(.06)
DA: ∆+log(HH inc) .05
(.06)
CMA: ∆−log(HH inc) −.82∗
(.11)

























pseudo-R2 .005 .002 .001
Signiﬁcance: 1%∗ 5� 10�∗
Table 8: Symmetry in comparison effect. Unlike in other tables, the coefﬁcients
on region averages here are ∆±
r rather than δr; see equation (4).
24The results in Table 8 corroborate the ﬁndings of Luttmer (2005) by showing
an absence of any asymmetry in coefﬁcients between those individuals who are
above and below the average at each geographical scale. This pattern is revealed
for each of the observed values of income, house value, and house size. This
symmetry seems somewhat surprisingly close, but considering that explanations
are given above for either of the other alternatives, we may say without identifying
the psychological channels more explicitly that our observations might represent
some zero-sum combination of asymmetric effects.
A slightly different question is whether the Veblen effect is stronger for indi-
viduals with higher or lower absolute income levels. In order to treat this question,
we conducted a semi-parametric regression in which the box kernel ranged over
absolute household income.15 Figure 3 shows the results both for a simpliﬁed
equation containing household and CT mean incomes along with our standard
controls and trust in neighbours, and for a more complete speciﬁcation containing
referenceincomelevelsforthreegeographicscalesaswellasthesamecontrols. In
both cases, the coefﬁcient on absolute income increases with income, suggesting
an imperfect speciﬁcation. For the simpler equation the CT-level Veblen coefﬁ-
cient is approximately constant, while the more complete speciﬁcation contains
the suggestion that the CT-level reference effect also increases with increasing
income.
3.8 Geo-demographic reference groups
Various mechanisms by which geographic proximity might help to determine ref-
erence group formation are plausible. For example, people are likely to interact
with their close neighbours and community members in a number of contexts,
are likely to work alongside and commute past people who live in the same city,
and are likely to have grown up or attended high school in the same metropoli-
tan region. Effective reference levels may be set by emulating one’s friends or
coworkers, by absorbing some standard from the broader anonymous population,
or through some other process of social interaction or information dissemination.
Byusingindividual-leveldatafromthe2001census, weareabletoconstructsome
mean incomes for simple, identiﬁable sub-samples of the population in each cen-
sus region. Table 9 contains a summary of the ﬁndings when local members of
15An ordered logit model was estimated separately for numerous subsamples, each subsample
corresponding to respondents with incomes in a particular range, noted in Figure 3 as the kernel
width. Using smaller kernel widths resulted in noisier but consistent patterns.









































Figure 3: Veblen coefﬁcients as a function of income. Dotted lines show the
range of one standard error.
26one’s age group or local members of one’s visible minority group are used as a
reference set. Age categories are 15-19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–64, and
65+ years, while the “visible minority” designations are those deﬁned by Statis-
tics Canada: Chinese, South Asian, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Southeast
Asian, Arab, West Asian, Korean, Japanese, and Other visible minorities. Only
respondents who fall into one of the respective categories are included in the “Age
Group” and “Visible minority” estimates. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly reduced CMA
income comparison effect when one’s own age group is used as a reference, but
at least as strong an effect at the CT level. Suggestive of a similar but weaker
ﬁnding to that of Kingdon and Knight (2007) for the “divided society” of South
Africa is our ﬁnding of an absense of a comparison effect at the CT level com-
bined with a stronger one at the scale of CSDs when visible minority groups are
the candidate reference group.16 However, our sample sizes becomes small when
restricted to these categories. Further investigation along these lines appears to
be warranted. For instance, Charles et al. (2007) report a stronger conspicuous
consumption behaviour for certain visible minority or ethnic groups.
3.9 Further robustness checks
Table 10 contains a summary of some further checks of the robustness of our es-
timates. Using OLS or ordered probit in place of ordered logit gives comparable
raw coefﬁcients (with the standard factor between probit and logit). Eliminating
respondents who reported the highest possible score for SWL does change the pic-
ture slightly but leaves unchanged, in particular, the strong negative consumption
externality at the CT level.
3.10 Absolute and relative beneﬁts of health
For informing policy, empirical well-being research might have little to say if
it was found that all determinants of SWL contributed only relatively through
context-dependentreferencelevels. Alpizaretal.(2005)posedhypotheticalchoices
to students in order to assess the positional and relative beneﬁts of different kinds
of goods. They found that utility from most goods derives from both absolute
and relative consumption, although certain goods such as leisure and insurance
provide more absolute beneﬁts than housing and income.
16Because “visible minority” status is only available in one survey, a proper comparison of
coefﬁcients considers only the EDS results for the “All” and “Visible minority” cases detailed in

































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
log(HH inc) .28∗ .27∗ .29∗ .37∗ .37∗ .27∗ .29∗ .32∗ .37∗ .37∗ .069 .091 .075 .075
(.036) (.032) (.037) (.087) (.087) (.036) (.034) (.039) (.087) (.087) (.10) (.061) (.10) (.10)
CT: log(HH inc) −.29 −.32∗ −.36∗ −.36∗ −.22∗ −.20∗ −.58∗ −.58∗ .35 .33 .082 .082
(.13) (.097) (.091) (.091) (.12) (.11) (.088) (.088) (.32) (.25) (.29) (.29)
CSD: log(HH inc) −.21 −.16 −.16 −.11 −.17 −.17 −.28 −1.25 −1.25
(.28) (.26) (.26) (.26) (.11) (.11) (.91) (.52) (.52)
CMA: log(HH inc)−1.67∗ −1.67∗ −.38 −.38 −1.40 −1.40
(.39) (.39) (.26) (.26) (1.19) (1.19)
∑βinc −1.88∗ .19 −.004 .37∗ −.97 .058 .11 .37∗ −1.26 −.83 .16
(.40) (.24) (.047) (.087) (.48) (.042) (.069) (.087) (.98) (.79) (100.0) (0)
health 2.63∗ 2.60∗ 2.69∗ 3.26∗ 2.64∗ 2.61∗ 2.70∗ 3.26∗
(.091) (.099) (.11) (.39) (.091) (.10) (.11) (.39)
trust-N 1.24∗ 1.24∗ 1.26∗ 1.73∗ 1.23∗ 1.22∗ 1.27∗ 1.73∗ 1.57∗ 1.59∗ 1.57∗
(.063) (.064) (.058) (.15) (.063) (.064) (.059) (.15) (.22) (.22) (.24)
trust-G .007 .024 .033 .049 .002 .026 .035 .049 .092 .10∗ .12∗
(.029) (.020) (.026) (.071) (.029) (.021) (.026) (.071) (.088) (.036) (.073)
controls � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �
geo ﬁxed effects CMA CSD CT � CMA CSD CT � CMA CSD CT �
survey �3� �3� �3� �2� �2� �3� �3� �3� �2� �2� ED ED ED ED ED
obs. 37701 3760135937 9851 ≥9851 376473754735896 9851 ≥9851 4581 4541 4425 0 ≥0
pseudo-R2 .057 .061 .066
Nclusters 18 50
Table 9: Demographic / geographic subpopulations as reference groups.
Columns labeled “All” show ordered logit estimates for all respondents using
overall means as reference levels. “Age Group” estimates use mean incomes
from respondents’ own age group as reference levels. “Vismin” estimates include
only visible minority respondents and their own-group’s mean incomes. Columns
marked with a �for “geo ﬁxed effects” show summary coefﬁcients of the kind de-
scribed on page 16. Other columns represent coefﬁcients averaged over surveys,
as in the shaded columns of Table 2 on page 14. Detailed estimates summarised
in this table are found in Table 16 on page 50. Signiﬁcance: 1%∗ 5� 10�∗
28(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(HH inc) .27∗ .35∗ .33∗ .36∗ .17∗ .21∗ .52∗ .92∗
(.037) (.090) (.035) (.080) (.021) (.048) (.052) (.24)
DA: log(HH inc) .28 .27 .31∗ .31 .17 .15 .45∗ −.085
(.13) (.29) (.11) (.26) (.074) (.16) (.16) (.75)
CT: log(HH inc) −.43∗ −.51∗ −.48∗ −.53∗ −.28∗ −.32∗ −.32 −.47∗
(.16) (.12) (.14) (.10) (.091) (.070) (.20) (.17)
CSD: log(HH inc) −.24 −.12 −.14 −.050 −.10 −.043 −.33 −.43
(.22) (.16) (.18) (.12) (.12) (.095) (.27) (.17)
CMA: log(HH inc)−1.08∗ −1.08∗ −.91∗ −.91∗ −.64∗ −.64∗ −.72 −.72
(.26) (.26) (.22) (.22) (.15) (.15) (.33) (.33)
∑βinc −1.19∗ −.92∗ −.69∗ .53
(.28) (.29) (.16) (.27)
health 2.61∗ 2.03∗ 1.44∗ 2.32∗
(.091) (.074) (.052) (.099)
trust-N 1.25∗ .99∗ .70∗ 1.15∗
(.061) (.052) (.034) (.071)
controls � � � � � � � �
geo ﬁxed effects � � � �
survey �3� �2� �3� �2� �3� �2� �3� �2�
SWL�=10 � �
ologit � � � �
OLS � �
oprobit � �
obs. 36931 ≥9620 36931≥962036931≥962024893≥1969
Table 10: Robustness checks for estimates of SWL. Summary of estimates in
the format described on page 16. Signiﬁcance: 1%∗ 5� 10�∗
29(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(HH inc) .35∗ .34∗ .34∗ .65∗ .65∗
(.057) (.056) (.061) (.20) (.20)
DA: log(HH inc) .49∗ .50∗ .56∗ .16 .16
(.16) (.15) (.17) (.52) (.52)
CT: log(HH inc) −.37∗ −.41 −.46∗ −.46∗
(.20) (.17) (.16) (.16)
CSD: log(HH inc) −.41 −.29 −.29
(.30) (.25) (.25)
CMA: log(HH inc)−1.24∗ −1.24∗
(.36) (.36)
health 2.72∗ 2.71∗ 2.78∗ 3.39∗ 3.39∗
(.089) (.088) (.10) (.35) (.35)
CT: health .24 .24 .14 .14
(.15) (.15) (.17) (.17)
CSD: health −.16 −.094 −.094
(.49) (.51) (.51)
CMA: health 1.18∗ 1.18∗
(.69) (.69)
controls � � � � �
Geo dummies CMA CSD CT �
survey �2� �2� �2� �1� �1�
obs. 13695 1358812596 1474 ≥1474
pseudo-R2
Table 11: Spillover effects of others’ health. The ﬁrst four columns represent co-
efﬁcients averaged over surveys, as in the shaded columns of Table 2 on page 14.
The ﬁfth column shows summary coefﬁcients of the kind described on page 16.
Detailed estimates summarised in this table are found in Table 18 on page 58.
Signiﬁcance: 1%∗ 5� 10�∗
30We test this proposition for one important determinant of SWL. Table 11
shows that, when incomes are controlled for, regional averages of others’ health
have only positive or insigniﬁcant effects on individual SWL. According to this
estimate, it may be extrapolated that improving everyone’s health at once would
makealargepositiveincreasetoSWL.Largerscalestudiesbasedoncross-country
regressions provide further support for the claim that certain non-pecuniary but
more objectively measured community attributes, for instance those relating to
social capital, are highly valuable social aims from a well-being perspective.
4 Discussion
In investigating the effects of geographic income comparison groups, the focus of
our analysis has been on ex post welfare, as measured by SWL. Before drawing
any practical implications from our ﬁndings, we point out several complications
in interpreting this subject.
Welfarism and relativism
It is common to recognise three ways in which one’s own outcomes are put into
perspective in the subjective assessment of satisfaction. These correspond to
memories of one’s past (hence accomodation to status quo), comparison to con-
temporary norms, and reference to aspirations. By focusing on a cross-section in
time and by looking at different potential geographic comparison groups, we are
probably learning most about the geographic structure of contemporary norms.
Aspirations might be thought of as a calculation of what is reasonably attainable;
like the others, this is a standard which affects our satisfaction (Stutzer, 2004).
Aspirations may be determined in part by the other two inﬂuences (comparison
withone’spastandwithone’ssociety’soutcomes)butotherstructuralfactorssuch
as personal and institutional constraints will also affect how these aspirations are
cognitively formed.
It may be noted that all three contextual effects follow from the evolutionary
arguments of Rayo and Becker (2004) and that all result in mean reference levels
rising or falling in tandem with consumption levels over time. Thus any of the
three can account for the observation that among many nations, average SWL
does not grow with national income.
When considered separately, however, these comparison channels may lead
to different policy considerations. For instance, aspirations can be expanded up-
31wards for the majority through a relaxation of class constraints; indeed, the for-
mation of a middle class and an increase in social mobility may be a major driver
of economic growth through this channel of aspirations (Galbraith, 1979). Well-
being effects of reference group emulation can be minimised by decreasing dis-
parities, and evidence of strong adaptation to income levels over time indicates a
SWL value of economic growth and of increasing compensation rates as a func-
tion of age, though not necessarily beyond those which reﬂect increasing produc-
tivity due to experience.
Some signiﬁcant warnings have been articulated which lie in the way of such
conclusions, especiallyastheyrelatetothemeasurementandalleviationofpoverty.
Galbraith (1979), in his discussion of the impact of economic aspirations, sug-
gests that people adapt to rates of economic growth just as they do to levels of
income, and Sen (1983) in his description of the “capabilities approach” warns
against absurd prescriptions which may result from an entirely relativist view of
welfare. Sen (1999) has further warned against the metric of utilities, or “wel-
farism”, because it may lead to the implication that limiting people’s knowledge
or aspirations is good social policy. Nevertheless, and especially in a relatively
open and democratic society, SWL meets Sen’s own criterion of measuring peo-
ple’s ability to do and to be what they value. Kingdon and Knight (2003) argue
that SWL may be an excellent candidate for an encompassing welfare measure
even for developing economies.
Endogenous choice of comparison groups and maximisation of
SWL
Hardly any choices are as interactive and interdependent as the choice
of whom to associate with, live with, work with, or play with ...
(Schelling, 2006, p. 43)
If people are sophisticated in their selection of where to live and with whom to
socialise, they will take into account any repercussions that set standards for their
own future emulation. This remains a difﬁcult complication to the normative
assessment of reference level effects, yet it is mitigated by our use of controls,
including the “mastery” measure, and in part by our ﬁnding that one dominant
comparison group is broadly distributed across metropolitan regions. The latter
fact means that most relocations are less likely to change urban Canadians’ con-
temporary reference standards. On the other hand, endogenous choice between
different metropolitan areas is poorly accounted for in our work, as is the selection
32of non-geographic social groups. While mobility between CMAs is quite limited,
selection of one’s residential CT is much more common. If this decsion is made
with the milieu of afﬂuence in mind as an inﬂuence on one’s own consumption
standards, it ought, however, to work against our results, attenuating the negative
coefﬁcient on others’ CT income. Knight and Song (2006) explicitly asked re-
spondents about their income reference group. They ﬁnd that individuals who are
the least content are those with the geographically broadest reference group.17
Falk and Knell (2004) analyse competing effects in comparison group selec-
tion and the formation of aspirations when there are both relative and absolute
returns to well-being. They predict a positive correlation between ability and en-
dogenous standards. On the other hand, there is also strong evidence that people
do not fully realise that reference standards will change and therefore that some
superﬁciallyattractivechoiceswillnotendupbeingbeneﬁcial(Loewensteinetal.,
2003). The inclusion in surveys of explicit questions concerning subjective refer-
ence groups, such as took place in Wave 3 (2006) of the European Social Survey
and in the work of Knight and Song (2006), is therefore a valuable innovation.
There is, furthermore, evidence of systematic deviations from optimisation of
SWL. The question of what contributes to SWL as a welfare measure (utility in
Jeremy Bentham’s sense) is quite distinct from the question of whether SWL is
a good approximation for utility as in choice theory. Wilson and Gilbert (2005)
discuss humans’ limited ability and systematic inability to forecast their own af-
fect. Dunn et al. (2003) address speciﬁcally the issue of residence location choice;
they use a natural experiment of undergraduate housing assignment as evidence
of systematic misprediction of the determinants of one’s own SWL.
Thus, the emulation of neighbours or social peers as a behaviour needs to
be assessed independently from the reference setting that plays a role in SWL
assessment. Nevertheless, our results represent a clearly signiﬁcant effect of ex
post neighbours’ income.
5 Conclusion
We have attempted both to identify the geographic scales which best describe
income comparison groups in Canadian cities and, to some degree, to separate
income comparison effects from social beneﬁts such as are exhibited by a feel-
ing of trust. Our ﬁnding that income comparison, or emulation, effects dominate
17Their work is reported as preliminary.
33empathetic ones at levels of metropolitan regions and census tracts is not incon-
sistent with the ﬁndings of Kingdon and Knight (2007) for South Africa. They
report negative spillovers of income at the district level (with mean populations
of 125,000) but positive spillovers within smaller clusters (with mean population
2,900). Our evidence for an empathetic pattern of income spillover effects on the
most local scale is weakerthan theirs, although we ﬁnd that trust in neighbourshas
spillover effects on an even smaller scale than Kingdon and Knight (2007) can re-
solve, as well as at larger scales beyond the neighbourhood. We ﬁnd consistently
weaker or nonexistent net effects of others’ income at the CSD, or municipal,
scale, which is suggestive that tax-funded public goods are an important compo-
nent of the actual consumption which we would ideally have used in place of our
measure of income.
Because of the limited number and variability in CMAs that are intrinsic to
Canadian data, our conclusions regarding CMA level effects must remain quite
tentative. They nevertheless reﬂect a strong and important negative association
between mean CMA income and mean CMA life satisfaction. It may be that
inhabitants of cosmopolitan cities, even in developing nations, form their refer-
ence groups in a different manner than do rural dwellers. Our ﬁndings do not
explain this process and suggest either (1) that comparison groups might con-
sist of more individually speciﬁc socially connected networks which tend to be
dispersed throughout a broad geographical region or (2) that within metropolitan
regions there is high accessibility of information about others’ living standards or,
at least, wages.
On the other hand income externalities at the census tract level appear to be
strong and robust. It may be thought that if urban regions are sites of particularly
intense competition over consumption or income status, then past and ongoing
urbanisation may have an important effect on production and consumption growth
for reasons other than efﬁciency of production due to agglomeration. However,
we do not ﬁnd evidence of an upward bias to the reference setting. As discussed
above, others’ results on this question vary. If such reference behaviour is mean-
reverting emulation rather than a more one-sided high status seeking, then this
aspect of preferences cannot be said to be driving needless economic growth.
If the results we ﬁnd for income relativities should withstand further tests and
appear robustly in subsequent surveys, the negative sum of the coefﬁcients on own
and comparator incomes suggests the existence of strongly negative consumption
externalities. Moreover, these results ignore the negative intergenerational envi-
ronmental externalities that result from rising global levels of material consump-
tion. Further research is needed to unravel the roles that advertising and other
34forces play in setting standards for emulation. It has been suggested, for example
by Bertrand et al. (2006), that the aggregate negative externalities are made larger
by a preponderance of advertising and other information ﬂows advocating higher
levels of material consumption relative to activities with positive externalities. A
better understanding of how norms are established could help to permit individu-
als to increase their own SWL while not damaging that of their neighbours or of
those in subsequent generations.
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